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CASES NOTED
FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY: A LACK OF DISCRETION?
The defendants were indicted in Dade County, Florida, for first de-
gree murder. The trial judge dismissed the indictment, stating that Flor-
ida Statutes, section 782.04 (1971), which defines the crime of murder,
and section 921.141 (1971), which provides the procedural alternatives
for sentencing following a conviction for a capital felony, were unconstitu-
tional. The reason for the court's determination was that the sections pro-
vided for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, as construed
by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.' The state ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Florida,2 which held, reversed: The Flor-
ida death penalty statutes are not violative of the eighth or fourteenth
amendments. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
Prior to Dixon, the United States Supreme Court, in determining the
constitutionality of the death penalty, held that "the imposition and carry-
ing out of the death penalty in these cases [with the possible exception
of a very few mandatory statutes] constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."3 Accord-
ingly, each of the three cases before the Court was "reversed insofar as it
leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed."4 Two of the opinions
written by the Furman majority held capital punishment per se a viola-
tion of the United States Constitution, while the remaining three opinions
agreed that discretionary death penalties are unconstitutional. This deci-
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) [hereinafter cited as Furman].
2. This case was consolidated with three others which were certified and involved the
same question of law.
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
4. Id. at 240. Each of the Justices wrote a separate opinion in Furman; the decision
was 5 to 4. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice
White and Mr. Justice Marshall wrote concurring opinions. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr.
Justice Blackmun, Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote dissenting opinions.
5. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall shared the view that the death pen-
alty is unconstitutional per se regardless of the presence or absence of the sentencer's discre-
tion. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306, 314-74 (1972). As Mr. Chief Justice Burger
expressed it, those two Justices "concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital
punishment for all crimes and under all circumstances." Id. at 375. See also the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Powell. Id. at 415.
Mr. Justice Douglas made it clear that his view would strike down any discretionary
capital punishment provision, reserving only the question of the constitutionality of a manda-
tory capital punishment provision. "Whether a mandatory death penalty would otherwise
[if.evenhandedly applied] be constitutional is a question I do not reach." Id. at 257.
Mr. Justice Stewart, also specified that statutes which make "the death penalty the
mandatory punishment" are the only ones he considered to be beyond the scope of the Fur-
man decision. Id. at 306-10. He maintained that if not mandatory, "death sentences are the
product of a legal system that brings them . . . within the very core of the Eighth Amend-
ment's guarantee .... ." Id. at 309.
Mr. Justice White similarly reserved only the question of "[t]he facial constitutionality
of statutes requiring the imposition of the death penalty," because it was not before the
Court. Id. at 310. His opinion dearly reached "the constitutionality of capital punishment
statutes under which . . . the legislature does not itself mandate the penalty in any particu-
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sion was followed by a series of approximately 120 unanimous per curiam
opinions by the Court invalidating the unexecuted death sentences im-
posed under twenty six discretionary state death statutes. 6
In accordance with the doctrine enunciated in Furman, the Supreme
Court of Florida declared in Donaldson v. Sack that "Florida no longer
has what has been termed a 'capital case'."17 Following this decision, the
court reversed the death sentences of all the death row inmates in Flor-
ida.8 The highest courts of the other twenty five states which have ruled
on this question have similarly invalidated every form of discretionary
death sentencing procedure under Furman. In response to the Florida
court, and in recognition of Furman, the Florida Legislature enacted a
new death penalty statute. The provisions of the new statute retained
murder and rape as capital felonies.9 Procedural changes as to how to
impose death sentences were made, but it appears that the discretionary
factors found prohibitive in Furman remain in this process.10
In determining the constitutionality of the new statute, the court in
Dixon ruled that the "mere presence of discretion in the sentencing pro-
cedure cannot render the procedure violative of Furman ... rather, [it
was] the quality of discretion and the manner in which it was applied that
dictated the rule ... .1' The court reasoned that if the discretion neces-
sary in the statute is "reasonable and controlled," and not "capricious and
discriminatory," the test of Furman is fulfilled. This conclusion was
reached despite the fact that the Supreme Court has overturned every dis-
cretionary death sentence, regardless of its form or nature, that has come
before it. 2
lar class or kind of case ...but delegates to judges or juries the decisions as to those cases,
if any, in which the penalty will be utilized." Id. at 311.
6. Prior to Furman, Florida provided for imposition of the death penalty in cases of
murder and rape. FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(1), 794.01 (1971). It was also available for a number
of other crimes (bombing or machine gunning in public places and kidnapping for ransom)
but, practically speaking, never used. The former death penalty sentencing provisions pro-
vided that the life-death decision was in the hands of the jury, with a majority of the jurors
sufficient to make a binding recommendation of life imprisonment. FLA. STAT. § 921.141
(1971).
7. 265 So. 2d 499, 505 (Fla. 1972).
8. Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972) ; In re Baker, 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972).
9. The Governor's Committee to Study Capital Punishment recommended to the legis-
lature that rape not be made capital since "[it is believed that prior classification of rape
as a capital felony under these circumstances has resulted in disparities and too often reflects
racial bias." FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE TO STUDY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
at 155 (November, 1972).
10. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (Supp. 1972).
.11. 283 So. 2d at 6.
12. Mr. Justice Stewart specifically listed the types of capital punishment provisions not
immediately affected by the Court's decision. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307 (1972).
These are all instances where legislatures have "specified that the penalty of death shall be the
mandatory punishment for every person convicted of engaging in certain designated criminal
conduct." Id. at 307. Mr. Justice Powell made the same point: "[Wihile statutes in 40
states permit capital punishment for a variety of crimes, the constitutionality of a very few
mandatory statutes remains undecided. See concurring opinions by Mr. Justice Stewart and
Mr. Justice White. Since Rhode Island's only capital statute-murder by a life term prisoner
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The majority in Dixon enumerated five statutory steps between con-
viction and the imposition of the death penalty which "provide adequate
safeguards against discretion.' 18 One of the "safeguard" steps is the estab-
lishment of a bifurcated trial system in which the defendant is convicted
in one trial and the determination of whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death is made in another. This provision for bifurcated trials
is not a unique innovation. Indeed, similar bifurcated trial systems which
were in effect in several states were declared unconstitutional in Furman.14
At the sentencing proceeding, evidence is admitted which relates to the
enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the statute.15
Additional evidence may be admitted on any matter the trial court deems
"relevant" and of "probative value." All of this evidence is then weighed
to determine if it is "sufficient" to impose the death penalty. Other than
the requirement that the circumstances must be "sufficient," the new stat-
ute provides no other guidelines. Therefore the statute allows judicial de-
termination in this process to be dependent upon the undirected discretion
of the individual jurors and trial judge.
-is mandatory, no law in that State is struck down by virtue of the Court's decision today."
Id. at 417 n.2.
Furthermore, the Florida Attorney General concluded, on the basis of the Furman de-
cision, that the legislature could constitutionally reenact capital punishment only "so long
as said legislation is mandatory in its terms." 283 So. 2d at 14, citing Memorandum, Attorney
General of Florida at 7 (July 7, 1972).
13. First, the question of punishment is reserved for a post-conviction hearing so
that the trial judge and jury can hear other information regarding the defendant
and the crime of which he has been convicted before determining whether or not
death will be required.
The second step of the sentencing procedure is that the jury . . . must hear
the new evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing and make a recommenda-
tion as to the penalty, that is, life or death....
The third step . . . is that the trial judge actually determines the sentence to
be imposed-guided by, but not bound by, the findings of the jury ....
The fourth step . . . is that the trial judge justifies his sentence of death in
writing.
The most important safeguard presented in FLA. STAT. § 921.141, is the pro-
pounding or aggravating and mitigating circumstances which must be determinative
of the sentence imposed.
283 So. 2d at 7-8.
14. At the time of Furman, six states provided for bifurcated trials in capital cases:
CAL. PENAL CODE, § 190.1 (Deering 1966); Com. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-10 (1960); GA.
CODE ANN., § 27-2534 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.30, .35 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963) ; TEXAS CODE CRLM. PROC. AN. art. 37.07 (1966). Four of these
states had capital cases before the United States Supreme Court, and the death sentence in
each case was reversed. Davis v. Connecticut, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Jackson v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972); Scoleri v. Pennsylvania, 408 U.S. 934 (1972); Phelan v. Brierley, 408
U.S. 939 (1972); Matthews v. Texas, 408 U.S. 940 (1972); Curry v. Texas, 408 U.S. 939
(1972); McKenzie v. Texas, 408 U.S. 938 (1972). New York had no case before the Court
and California had, shortly before Furman, ruled the state's death penalty unconstitutional.
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972) ; see Aikens v.
California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972).
15. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (Supp. 1972). New York law provided basically this same
element and was subsequently declared unconstitutional. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1970-71), § 125.35 (McKinney 1967).
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The possibilities of variation in the process of weighing and apprais-
ing factors are limitless, resulting in death sentences which are uncon-
trollably discretionary in fact."0 Such weighing of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances was also required by several states, either by statute
or case law, but their death penalty statutes were found to be unconstitu-
tional as a result of Furman. 7
In Dixon, the majority of the court stated that the existence of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances is "[t] he most important safe-
guard presented in Fla. Stat. § 921.141 ... ."I' because the aggravating
circumstances actually define those crimes for which the death penalty is
applicable in the absence of mitigating circumstances. In reference to this
same type of reasoning, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Furman,
stated that:
all past efforts to "identify before the fact" the cases in which
the penalty is to be imposed have been "uniformly unsuccess-
ful" . . . .One problem is that "the factors which determine
whether the sentence of death is the appropriate penalty in par-
ticular cases are too complex to be compressed within the limits
of a simple formula . . ." As the Court stated in McGautha,
"[t]he infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would
make general standards either meaningless 'boiler plate' or a
statement of the obvious that no jury would need." Thus, unless
the Court in McGautha misjudged the experience of history,
there is little reason to believe that sentencing standards in any
form will substantially alter the discretionary character of the
prevailing system of sentencing in capital cases."'
Therefore, it appears that the listing of all the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances which should be considered in deciding whether to impose
the death penalty is an impossible task, and that the discretion applied in
the new Florida death statute is incapable of being controlled.
In addition to the discretionary elements in section 921.141(4), the
vague words used to describe the enumerated aggravating and mitigating
circumstances are subject to varying interpretations by both judges and
juries. For example, one of the mitigating circumstances requires a show-
ing of no "significant" history of prior activity, the influence of "extreme"
16. For further analysis on this point, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Ervin, 283
So. 2d at 11.
17. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46(a) (Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN., § 2A; 113-4
(1969); TENN. CODE ANN., §§ 39-2406 (1955); People v. Black, 367 Ill. 209, 10 N.E.2d
801 (1937) ; People v. Sullivan, 345 Ill. 87, 177 N.E. 733 (1931) ; Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb.
550, 48 N.W.2d 689 (1951); Lewis v. State, 451 P.2d 399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949); Waters
v. State, 197 P.2d 299 (Okla. Crim. App. 1948); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151
A.2d 241 (1959); Commonwealth v. Irelam, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941); Commonwealth
v. Garramore, 307 Pa. 507, 161 A. 733 (1932); State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 195 A.2d 449
(1963) ; State v. Tudor, 154 Ohio St. 249, 95 N.E.2d 385 (1950).
18. 283 So. 2d at 8.
19. 408 U.S. 238, 401 (1972) (Burger C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
CASES NOTED
mental or emotional disturbance, or domination by another.2 0 Subjective
determinations must be made as to whether such factors are present in a
particular case, in accord with the various backgrounds and experiences
of the individuals who will be applying these standards. The magnitude
of these variables would most certainly eliminate any possibility of con-
trol in the area of discretion. The same faults exist in the aggravating cir-
cumstances, such as "the felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel."21 As the majority of the court recognized, "to a layman, no capi-
tal crime might appear to be less than heinous .... ))22
History indicates that the American people have effectively repu-
diated any discretionary death penalty by seldom imposing it, thereby repu-
diating any justification of a "compelling state interest."2 All concurring
Justices in Furman premised their decisions upon evidence demonstrating
the progressive decline, nationwide and worldwide, in the use of the death
penalty.-4 The majority of the court in Dixon failed to mention this seem-
ingly relevant concept notwithstanding its strong application by the con-
curring Justices in Furman.
The entire thrust of the decisions in Furman was to determine the
death penalty's validity under the eighth amendment. The Court looks to
how the penalty has been applied by the people, not to whether the pen-
alty is legislatively authorized or approved by public opinion. For ex-
ample, if a law is not applied frequently and uniformly, it may affront
20. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (Supp. 1972).
21. Id.
22. 283 So. 2d at 8.
23. Referring to the selection of capital felons as a class upon which the death pen-
alty may be imposed, Justice Ervin in his dissenting opinion stated:
A stricter requirement has been employed . . . where the classification restricts
a "fundamental right." In cases involving such classifications ... the states have been
required to prove that a "compelling state interest" is served by the classification.
283 So. 2d at 20.
Because of the infrequent use of the death penalty, it would seem reasonable, in
fact mandatory, that the Florida Legislature reconsider the purposes which have
traditionally been assumed to justify so harsh a penalty as death .... It is my con-
clusion ... that the death penalty is [not] supported by any compelling state inter-
est.
283 So. 2d at 21.
24. For example, Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
There has been a steady decline in the infliction of this punishment in every
decade since the 1930's, the earliest period from which accurate statistics are avail-
able. In the 1930's, executions averaged 167 per year; in the 1940's, the average was
128, in the 1950's, it was 72, and in the years 1960-1962 it was 48. There have been
a total of 46 executions since then, 36 of them in 1963-1964. Yet our population and
the number of capital crimes committed have increased greatly over the past four
decades. The contemporary rarity of the infliction of this punishment is the end re-
sult of a long-continued decline. . . . When a country of over 200 million people
inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50 times a year, the inference
is strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly applied.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291-93 (1972) ; see also id. at 299, 386-87. The other con-
curring opinions have similar comments, thus suggesting that the death penalty violates
"contemporary standards of decency," the relevant eighth amendment test, and is uncon-
stitutional.
1974]
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contemporary standards of decency, but not generate the public pressure
necessary to secure its repeal by the legislature.2" The United States Su-
preme Court in Weems v. United States,26 stated that the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause is not static but progressive, "[it] is not fastened
to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes en-
lightened by a human justice."2 Indeed, Florida's recent history of re-
fusing to impose the death penalty reflects its public opinion in light of
which the death penalty's validity should be measured under the eighth
amendment.
Sir Winston Churchill wisely said in the House of Commons in 1910:
The word and temper of the public in regard to the treat-
ment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of
any country.
A calm, dispassionate recognition of the rights of the ac-
cused, and even of the convicted criminal, against the state; a
constant heart-searching by all charged with the duty of punish-
ment; a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of in-
dustry those who have paid their due in the hard coinage of
punishment, tireless efforts toward the discovery of curative and
regenerative processes; unfailing faith that there is a treasure if
you can only find it, in the heart of every man-these are the
symbols which in the treatment of crime and criminal mark and
measure the shored up strength of a nation, and are sign and
proof of the living virtue within it.26
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Weems that the eighth amend-
ment does acquire new meaning in relationship to the public's views on
certain punishments as cruel and unusual, and in view of the nationwide
trend of the American people refusing to apply the death penalty in any
mandatory form, the Florida Legislature and the Florida Supreme Court
will have to apply national constitutional standards in their further de-
termination of this issue. The citizens of Florida should not be deprived
of their right to life when all other citizens of this country are equally pro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States.
JOHN SPITTLER, JR.
25. The National Crime Commission recently noted that: "The most salient characteristic
of capital punishment is that it is infrequently applied. . . * [AIl available data indicate
that judges, juries, and governors are becoming increasingly reluctant to impose, or authorize
the carrying out of a death sentence." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMIISTRATION OF JUsTICE, REPORT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, at 143
(1967). All informed observers of the death penalty agree that a worldwide trend toward
its disuse is nothing short of drastic. See, e.g., United Nations, Department of Economics
and Social Affairs, Capital Punishment, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD 9-10, 81-82, 96-97 (1968).
26. 217 U.S. 349 (1910) [hereinafter referred to as Weems].
27. Id. at 378.
28, Quoted in 283 So. 2d at 23.
